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PREFACE: THE SECOND GENERATION 
OF SECOND AMENDMENT LAW & 
POLICY 
ERIC M. RUBEN AND DARRELL A. H. MILLER∗ 
The cacophonous and charged public debate over gun policy reflects a nation 
deeply divided about the appropriate balance between gun rights and gun 
regulation.1 The Second Amendment often dominates that debate—as both a 
symbol and a right enforceable in the courts. On April 8, 2016, scholars from 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds met at New York University School of Law to 
present new scholarship, a second generation of research, about this important 
constitutional provision.2 This issue is the product of that dialogue. 
Of course, a second generation implies that there was a first generation. The 
first generation of scholarship ended in 2008, when the Supreme Court issued the 
most important Second Amendment decision in the Court’s history—District of 
Columbia v. Heller.3 That first generation focused on a single question: Does the 
Second Amendment protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense, or a collective right connected to the maintenance of a well-regulated 
militia? 
This question garnered relatively little attention before the early twentieth 
century. Before then, federal gun control, as we understand it today, did not exist, 
and Second Amendment issues rarely arose. As Judge Thomas Cooley wrote in 
1868:  “How far it is in the power of the legislature to regulate [the Second 
Amendment] right, we shall not undertake to say, as happily there has been very 
little occasion to discuss that subject by the courts.”4 To be sure, many states and 
localities regulated weapons and some of these regulations were challenged on 
state constitutional law grounds.5 But generally these laws did not generate 
sustained Second Amendment analysis in light of the understanding, set forth 
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1.  See generally Chris Murphy, Keynote: The Second Generation of Second Amendment Law &
Policy, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017 at 233–34. 
2. The symposium was sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law and Law and Contemporary Problems at Duke University School of Law. 
3. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding for the first time that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms). 
4.  THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 350 (1868). 
5.  See generally Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment
Rights, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017 (surveying gun laws throughout American history). 
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most famously in Barron v. Baltimore,6 that the Bill of Rights limited only the 
federal government.7 
By the early 1900s, however, urbanization, crime, and the increased lethality 
of concealable weapons prompted calls for reform.8 State and local governments 
were the first to heed the calls, passing broad restrictions on the possession and 
carrying of handguns,9 but federal regulation was on the horizon. The 
opportunity to address the meaning of the Second Amendment right had arrived. 
Legal commentators in the first half of the twentieth century came to a fairly 
uniform conclusion: the Second Amendment protected a collective, not 
individual, right.10 The right was primarily concerned with the maintenance of a 
“well regulated Militia.”11 Thus, the Second Amendment would not prevent the 
federal government from passing laws targeting the possession and use of guns in 
crime. A 1915 essay by Maine Supreme Court Justice Lucilius A. Emery in the 
Harvard Law Review summarized the basis for this position, noting that “the 
right guaranteed is not so much to the individual for his private quarrels or feuds 
as to the people collectively for the common defense against the common enemy, 
foreign or domestic.”12 
Later, in 1934, the very first volume of Law and Contemporary Problems 
included an article mirroring this understanding, opining that “no regulation or 
restriction of firearms or weapons is in conflict with [the Second] Amendment 
unless it substantially impedes the maintenance of a militia sufficiently well-
equipped to assure the safety of the state.”13 That same year, Congress enacted 
the first federal law that could reasonably be called national gun control, the 
 
 6.  See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 7.  While some scattered contrarian state court decisions disagreed about the reach of the Bill of 
Rights, they were the exception, not the rule. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 153–56 (1998) (describing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846) and similar opinions 
as “contrarian” and in conflict with Barron). 
 8.  See Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 
473 (1915) (“The greater deadliness of small firearms easily carried upon the person, the alarming 
frequency of homicides and felonious assaults with such arms, the evolution of a distinct class of criminals 
known as ‘gunmen’ from their ready use of such weapons for criminal purposes, are now pressing home 
the question of the reason, scope, and limitation of the constitutional guaranty of a right to keep and bear 
arms,—of the extent of its restraint upon the legislative power and duty to prohibit acts endangering the 
public peace or the safety of the individual.”). 
 9.  See ADAM WINKLER, GUN FIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 204–10 (2011) (describing the Sullivan Law, an early New York permitting requirement for 
the purchase and possession of handguns; the Revolver Act, which was adopted by multiple states shortly 
afterward to mandate permits for concealed weapons; and the Uniform Firearms Act, which similarly 
regulated handguns). 
 10.  See Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, in THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT 
TO BEAR ARMS 16, 24–25, 36–37 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) (counting eleven law review articles discussing 
the Second Amendment between 1912 and 1959, each of which espoused the militia-related 
interpretation). 
 11.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 12.  Emery, supra note 8, at 477. 
 13.  John Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regulation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 400, 412 (1934). 
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National Firearms Act.14 More than ever before, the National Firearms Act 
provided the occasion for the Supreme Court to consider the scope of the Second 
Amendment. 
In 1939, in United States v. Miller, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the 
National Firearms Act’s prohibition on interstate transport of short-barreled 
shotguns.15 In so doing, the Court confirmed the growing consensus in legal 
scholarship about the meaning of the Second Amendment. “In the absence of 
any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel 
of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” the 
Court explained, “we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the 
right to keep and bear such an instrument.”16 
Miller appeared to settle many Second Amendment questions, and for over 
seventy years courts used it to turn away almost every Second Amendment 
challenge to a gun regulation. But the scholarly investigation continued, and 
gained momentum and financing with the rise of the modern gun rights 
movement in the 1970s.17 Researchers mining historical sources found support 
for a different understanding of the Second Amendment: one grounded in 
individual self-defense, not militia service. At first, this scholarship was 
considered an outlier. But with time, prominent legal scholars acknowledged the 
potential merit of the individual-right view, including leading liberal law 
professors such as Sanford Levinson and Laurence Tribe.18 
Once the individual-right scholarship was in place, advocates began 
challenging the militia-centric interpretation of the Second Amendment in court. 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, seventy years after Miller, the Supreme Court 
again considered the meaning and scope of the constitutional right to keep and 
bear arms.19 This time, a bare majority of the Court emphatically adopted the 
individual-right view, striking down a law banning the possession of operable 
handguns in the home.20 
Scholarship played a key role in Heller. There was almost no federal case law 
precedent to guide the Court. The most proximate Supreme Court case, Miller, 
was over half a century old and applied a vastly different interpretation of the 
 
 14.  National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–
5872 (2012)) (imposing a tax, registration requirement, and transfer restriction on certain machine guns 
and short-barreled shotguns). 
 15.  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  
 16.  Id. at 178. 
 17.  For discussions of the arc of modern Second Amendment scholarship before Heller, see 
generally MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY (2014); WINKLER, supra 
note 9; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 191 (2008). 
 18.  See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 897 n.211 (3d ed. 2000); Sanford 
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J. 637, 645–46 (1989).  
 19.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 20.  Id. 
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right.21 The Court in Heller could not rely solely, or even predominantly, on 
common law reasoning from incremental changes typical to the development of 
other constitutional rights. There was no slow buildup of favorable precedent, in 
the way that desegregation cases ultimately led to Brown v. Board of Education. 
The litigants and the Court had to draw on other sources from a relatively 
modern generation of research by litigants, activists, and academics. The various 
opinions in Heller cited close to twenty law review articles and at least a dozen 
other scholarly publications.22 
Two years after Heller, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court 
invoked its incorporation doctrine and applied the Second Amendment as a 
restraint on state and local governments.23 In so doing, the Court struck down a 
handgun ban in Chicago that was similar to the law struck down in the District of 
Columbia.24 With McDonald, the Second Amendment became an issue not only 
for Congress and the federal government, but also for every state legislature, 
county commissioner, and township trustee. 
Heller and McDonald represent a significant shift in the constitutional 
landscape for the right to keep and bear arms, but in one of the most cited 
passages in both opinions the Court also emphasized that the right is not 
unlimited, and that governments maintain broad regulatory authority.25 The right 
announced in Heller and McDonald, the Court instructed, “[should not be taken 
to] cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, 
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.’”26 
The Court also noted historical consensus about the constitutionality of bans on 
carrying concealed weapons.27 In a nod to other lawful regulations, the Court 
cautioned that this short list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” is not 
“exhaustive.”28 
Heller and McDonald opened the floodgates to hundreds of lawsuits raising 
a host of novel questions about the Second Amendment.29 A ban on handguns in 
 
 21.  See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. There was more recent state court precedent that 
analyzed state constitutional provisions analogous to the Second Amendment. But the Court did not use 
those modern cases as a resource.  It certainly did not use this precedent to craft a reasonable regulation 
model of the right. See Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
593, 594 (2006) (discussing state court decisions on state constitutional rights to keep and bear arms). 
 22.  See Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 23.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 24.  Id. at 749–50. 
 25.  Id. at 786; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 26.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27). 
 27.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  
 28.  Id. at 627 n.26. 
 29.  See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY 1–2 (Mar. 
31, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-March-
2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW5T-AD2D] (noting that after Heller courts have been 
“inundated” with Second Amendment challenges, leading to over 900 decisions).  
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the home may be unconstitutional, but what about bans on other types of 
weapons? For restrictions less severe than handgun bans, what standard of review 
should courts apply? What historical firearm measures not already identified by 
the Supreme Court should be considered presumptively lawful? The list of 
unanswered questions goes on and on. 
We characterize the scholarship addressing this new wave of questions as the 
second generation of Second Amendment scholarship. With this symposium and 
this publication we seek to avoid rehashing old debates; instead, we aim to push 
forward in new directions that can deepen our understanding of the Second 
Amendment in the post-Heller world. The authors featured in the coming pages 
are not of one discipline or mind. Analyzing gun rights and regulation through 
myriad lenses—history, political science, philosophy, sociology, public health, 
and law—furthers our understanding and broadens our perspective. 
While this compilation is interdisciplinary by design, historical considerations 
permeate the articles. The historical component in almost all of the contributions 
reflects, in large part, the profound influence of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
jurisprudential legacy. Heller, by some accounts, was Scalia’s crowning doctrinal 
achievement, “the finest example of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ 
jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”30 The opinion looked to 
history not only to support the Court’s interpretation of the meaning of the 
Second Amendment’s words, but also to support the validity of exceptions to 
Second Amendment coverage. Restrictions that are sufficiently “longstanding,” 
Heller instructs, are “presumptively lawful.”31 
Thus, under Heller, a long regulatory lineage creates a strong presumption 
that a given weapon regulation is constitutional. In The Right to Keep and Carry 
Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 
historian Saul Cornell explores the lineage of one common category of 
regulation: public carry restrictions.32 Examining an oft-overlooked resource, 
Justice of the Peace manuals, Cornell describes a historically broad ability to 
regulate public carry when and where it could disturb the peace. His provocative 
(and ironic) conclusion is that the historical treatment of public carry rights and 
regulations bears a close resemblance to the balancing view conveyed in Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s Heller dissent, which itself is not inconsistent with the 
originalist view in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. Cornell finds that 
“[s]omething analogous to a balancing exercise was fundamental to the way 
Anglo-American law dealt with arms . . . . The liberty interest associated with the 
right to arms was always balanced against the concept of the peace.”33 
  
 
 30.  Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What it Says, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2008, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121452412614009067 [https://perma.cc/Y8SP-L62S].  
 31.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26. 
 32.  See generally Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: 
Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017. 
 33.  Id. at 14. 
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Whereas Cornell’s contribution is a deep historical dive into one restriction, 
public carry laws, in Gun Law History in the United States and Second 
Amendment Rights, political scientist Robert Spitzer provides a broad empirical 
exposition of various gun regulations throughout American history. Spitzer 
shows how gun laws were “ubiquitous” in American history and have “spanned 
every conceivable category of regulation, from gun acquisition, sale, possession, 
transport, and use, including deprivation of use through outright confiscation, to 
hunting and recreational regulations, to registration and express gun bans.”34 
Spitzer’s description demonstrates how regulation has tracked changes in 
technology and public safety needs. One of the most interesting examples is 
precedent dating to the 1920s for bans on weapons now known as assault rifles. 
Such regulatory precedent begs a jurisprudential question that warrants further 
attention: If the “arms” protected by the Second Amendment can evolve (as 
Heller says they can35), then should the benchmark for what regulations are 
“longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” also evolve? More generally, Spitzer 
shows that gun rights and regulations need not be all or nothing. Indeed, “for the 
first 300 years of America’s existence, gun laws and gun rights went hand-in-
hand.”36 
History can buttress or undercut claims of permissible regulation under the 
Heller paradigm, but it can also elucidate other contours of the right. In Self-
Defense, Defense of Others, and the State,37 Darrell A. H. Miller describes the 
historical interplay between the state and lawful self-defense, which Heller 
instructs is “central to the Second Amendment right.”38 Miller shows that self-
defense always has “been heavily conditioned and constructed by the state.”39 
Indeed, for much of English legal history, self-defense was not thought of as a 
right at all, but rather an argument in favor of a pardon from the sovereign.40 The 
fact that self-defense did not historically operate as a purely natural law right, 
unconnected to public power, has legal and policy implications. Significantly, “[i]t 
suggests that the state has a power, and perhaps an obligation, to ensure that 
private capacity to render lethal force conforms to minimum standards of safety, 
training, and discipline.”41 
In Gendering the Second Amendment, sociologist Jennifer Carlson and 
political scientist Kristin Goss analyze historical conceptions of the state and how 
they are linked to gun rights. To assist in that endeavor, they consider the state 
and gun rights through the lens of gender—an underdeveloped theoretical 
framework in the Second Amendment debate. “[T]he exercise of gun rights and 
 
 34.  Spitzer, supra note 5, at 56.  
35.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.  
 36.  Spitzer, supra note 5, at 56.  
 37.  Darrell A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2017.  
 38.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 39.  Miller, supra note 37, at 86. 
 40.  Id. at 89. 
 41.  Id. at 87. 
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responsibilities,” they note, “is and always has been gendered” just as the “the 
state is and always has been gendered.”42 By tracing broad trends in American 
governance vis-à-vis gender, and relating those trends back to gun policy and 
practices, they offer an important perspective on the evolution of American gun 
policy and culture. Gendering the Second Amendment is a positive development 
in the scholarship dealing with the Second Amendment, especially because the 
intersection of the Second Amendment and gender has been woefully 
underexplored. Hopefully Carlson and Goss’s article will inspire additional 
research on this topic. 
Theoretical concepts like self-defense and gun rights have evolved over time 
and, of course, technology has too. In 3D-Printed Firearms, Do-It-Yourself Guns, 
& the Second Amendment, James Jacobs and Alex Haberman highlight 
regulatory challenges presented by modern gunsmithing technology. Heller 
suggested rules for what arms are protected by the Second Amendment—for 
example, those “‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-
defense”43—but it failed to establish clear guidance for dealing with new weapons 
and weapon-making technology. In the years since Heller, 3D printers have made 
increasingly sophisticated firearms, prompting widespread enforcement 
concerns. If anyone can manufacture a gun at home, what good are mandatory 
background checks? If guns can be constructed completely from plastic, might 
they evade metal detectors? Jacobs and Haberman address these novel issues, 
which will only become more relevant as technology advances. Though the 
authors conclude that restricting the publication of weapon-making software 
does not violate the Second Amendment, they also argue that 3D-printed guns 
are “a modest technological development rather than a game changer” in light of 
“how common gunsmithing has been, and is.”44 That said, with gun-making 
technology rapidly evolving, it is “none too soon to bring 3D gunsmithing into 
the debate about gun control.”45 
As the articles in this issue reflect, history has played a significant role in 
Second Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship since Heller. Nonetheless, 
most lower courts have not applied a purely originalist methodology in deciding 
Second Amendment challenges, and have relied instead on a mix of historical 
analysis and tiered scrutiny.46 Many challenged laws are pronounced neither 
categorically constitutional nor unconstitutional on historical grounds, but rather 
are scrutinized under means–end scrutiny common in other doctrinal settings. It 
is therefore often necessary to evaluate whether a governmental interest is 
sufficiently important to justify an impingement, and also whether an 
 
 42.  Jennifer Carlson & Kristin A. Goss, Gendering the Second Amendment, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2017 at 103. 
 43.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 624. 
 44.  James B. Jacobs & Alex Haberman, 3D-Printed Firearms, Do-It-Yourself Guns & the Second 
Amendment, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017 at 139–40. 
 45.  Id. at 141. 
 46.  See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012). 
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impingement is sufficiently necessary to achieve that interest. Several articles in 
this issue address questions within this emerging paradigm. 
 In Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, Eric M. 
Ruben considers when the government’s interest in preserving the perception of 
safety can justify a firearm restriction.47 That rationale was invoked to uphold a 
ban on assault weapons in a recent Seventh Circuit case,48 sparking controversy 
and raising a difficult doctrinal question: How can this justification be accepted 
for a gun restriction if it would be unacceptable for a speech restriction? Ruben 
concludes that the issue should be treated differently in the distinct context of the 
right to keep and bear arms, though courts should only accept public safety 
perceptions as a legitimate justification after they solve some doctrinal 
difficulties, such as ensuring that public perceptions do not belie illicit animus. 
Beyond historical and constitutional questions, critical policy issues remain 
concerning the right to keep and bear arms, especially where different groups of 
people have different capacities and authority to use deadly weapons and pose 
different risks to themselves and others. In Implementation and Effectiveness of 
Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, Jeffrey 
W. Swanson and his co-authors provide empirical evidence that could both 
motivate the adoption and justify the constitutionality of a particular gun policy: 
risk-based gun removals.49 Risk-based gun removal procedures, which authorize 
police to seize firearms in limited circumstances, have the potential to prevent 
gun violence (to self or others) without creating a criminal record. Do they work? 
According to Swanson et al., this mechanism, which has been adopted in 
Connecticut, Indiana, and California, has proven effective for preventing the 
most common type of gun death in America—suicide. Indeed, based on the 
results of an ambitious mixed-methods empirical study, the authors estimate that 
for every ten to twenty gun seizures, one suicide was prevented.50 
In Lawful Gun Carriers (Police and Armed Citizens): License, Escalation, and 
Race, Nicholas J. Johnson compares the formal and informal licenses and 
behavior of two groups of lawful gun carriers: police and lawful private gun 
carriers. According to one recent analysis, police in Florida are sanctioned for 
firearms crimes at a higher rate than lawful private gun carriers, and other studies 
show that such lawful private gun carriers commit far fewer crimes than do 
members of the general public.51 Thus, criminal behavior cannot be explained by 
the mere carrying of a gun. Rather, Johnson argues, it is best explained by the 
 
 47.  Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017.  
 48.  Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 
(2015). 
 49.  Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun 
Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017. 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  Nicholas J. Johnson, Lawful Gun Carriers (Police and Armed Citizens): License, Escalation, and 
Race, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017 at 220 n.52 (citing CRIME PREVENTION RES. CTR., 
CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 7–8 (2014)). 
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scope of the two groups’ respective firearm licenses: narrow for civilians and 
broad for police. Among other things, this conclusion about the role of a license 
“cuts against the argument that private gun carriers are a hazard because they 
are not trained like police.”52 More provocatively, this conclusion frames a 
normative question raised at the end of Johnson’s article: “why should [lawful 
private gun carriers] be less welcome in the community than police?”53 
Finally, the last two pieces in the issue provide commentary by two featured 
speakers at the April 8, 2016 symposium: Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and 
Sanford Levinson. Murphy’s keynote assesses the dysfunctional politics of gun 
rights and regulation. Murphy describes how the political left and right occupy 
“different planets” when it comes to firearm policies: the left is primarily 
concerned with “concrete details of gun laws” and the right is primarily 
concerned with “abstract concepts of liberty and freedom and revolution.”54 To 
reach “a common road to common ground,” Murphy suggests some ways leaders 
can “fix the bugs in the system that cause us to talk past each other.”55 
Sanford Levinson has been a leading thinker about the Second Amendment 
since he published The Embarrassing Second Amendment over twenty-five years 
ago.56 In his postscript to this issue, Levinson provides insightful observations 
about how notions of sovereignty have informed understandings of gun rights, 
regulation, and self-defense.57 Building on the contributions of Saul Cornell and 
Darrell A. H. Miller, Levinson offers an erudite and fascinating postscript to 
close the symposium. His final line highlights the urgency of continuing to 
grapple with what counts as legitimate violence in America: “[E]ven those of us 
who are onlookers, so to speak, neither directly inflicting the violence nor bearing 
its brunt, have reason to be concerned about the circumstances of its occurrence 
given both the moral questions surrounding them and the sheer political and 
social consequences for the societies we live in.”58 
The second generation of Second Amendment scholarship is still in its early 
years, and the articles presented in this issue raise as many questions as they 
answer. This publication will hopefully be an incubator, leading to other efforts 
to build on and respond to the arguments contained in this symposium. Forward-
thinking scholarship, after all, will continue to play a uniquely significant role in 
Second Amendment law and policy for years to come. Our hope is that this 
symposium, if nothing else, will motivate further research to advance the 
understanding of this polarizing and fascinating Amendment. 
 
 
 52.  Id. at 210. 
 53.  Id. at 230. 
54.    Murphy, supra note 1, at 233–34.  
55.    Id. at 238. 
56.    See Levinson, supra note 18. 
57.  Sanford Levinson, Postscript: Some Observations About Guns and Sovereignty, 80 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017. 
58.    Id. at 251.  
